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Abstract
An important issue in wireless communication is the interaction between selfish and independent wireless
communication systems in the same frequency band. Due to the selfish nature of each system, this interaction is
well modeled as a strategic game where each player (system) behaves to maximize its own utility. This paper studies
an interference interaction (game) where each system (player) has incomplete information about the other player’s
channel conditions. Using partial information, players choose between frequency division multiplexing (FDM) and
full spread (FS) of their transmitted power. An important notion in game theory is the Nash equilibrium (NE) which
represents a steady point in the game; that is, each player can only lose by unilaterally deviating from it. A trivial
Nash equilibrium point in this game is where players mutually choose FS and interfere with each other. This point
may lead to poor spectrum utilization from a global network point of view and even for each user individually.
In this paper, we provide a closed form expression for a non pure-FS ǫ-Nash equilibrium point; i.e., an
equilibrium point where players choose FDM for some channel realizations and FS for the others. To reach this
point, the only instantaneous channel state information (CSI) required by each user is its own interference-to-signal
ratio. We show that operating in this non pure-FS ǫ-Nash equilibrium point increases each user’s throughput and
therefore improves the spectrum utilization, and demonstrate that this performance gain can be substantial. Finally,
important insights are provided into the behaviour of selfish and rational wireless users as a function of the channel
parameters such as fading probabilities, the interference-to-signal ratio.
Index Terms
Dynamic Spectrum Access, Bayesian Games, Interference Channel, FDM, Nash Equilibrium, incomplete
Channel State information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication has become increasingly popular in recent years since more and more com-
munication systems share the same band. Consider for example an urban area with wireless local access
networks (LAN), bluetooth systems, cordless phone, etc. These systems create interference which results
in major performance loss. This is why, interference mitigation is such an important issue [e.g. 1–9].
In wireless networks, interference can be high and the channel is time varying [see e.g. 10]. Furthermore,
users may be independent of each other and selfish in the sense that each one is only interested in
maximizing its own utility. Thus, non cooperative game theory is an appropriate tool to analyze such
interactions. An important notion in game theory is the Nash equilibrium (NE) which represents a steady
point the game; that is, the NE point is a strategy profile which is the best response of each player given
that the others do not deviate from it. As such, it can be self imposed on network users who are selfish
in nature.
For the case of a flat fading interference channel with full information1 , it was shown [1] that Full
Spread (FS) is a NE point, and a sufficient condition for its uniqueness was derived. It was further observed
that in many cases the FS NE point leads to inefficient solutions. This happens when mutual FDM is
better for both users than mutual FS but the system operates in a mutual FS since the users are subject
to the prisoner’s dilemma [11].
The full information assumption is not always practical because communicating channel gains between
different users in a time varying channel within the channel coherence time may lead to large overhead.
Part of this paper will appear in ICASSP 2010.
1By complete information, we mean that every user knows all the direct and cross channel gains of all users in the network.
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(a) Wireless interference channel. (b) Action space
Fig. 1. (a) A wireless interference scenario with incomplete information. Each player knows the square magnitudes of its direct and
impinging channel gains and the statistics of its opponent’s channel gains. For example player 1 knows |H11|2 and |H12|2 but knows only
the statistics of |H22|2 and |H21|2. (b) the possible PSD configurations.
In this case, it is more appropriate to consider each channel coherence time as a one-stage game where
players are only aware of their own channel gains and their opponent’s channel statistics (which vary slowly
compared to the channel gains and therefore can be communicated [3]). The interaction between the players
may be repeated but with a different and independent channel realization each time and therefore is not
a repeated game. This motivates the use of games with incomplete information, also known as Bayesian
games [12, 13] which have been incorporated into wireless communications for problems such as power
control [14–16] and spectrum management in the interference channel [2, 17]. In [15], a distributed uplink
power control in a multiple access (MAC) fading channel was studied and shown to have a unique NE
point. This result however does not apply to the interference channel which is radically different. In a
MAC channel, user i’s direct channel gain is equal to the gain of the interference he creates for the other
users (j 6= i) while in the interference channel these parameters are independent. Thus, the interference
channel is composed of a double number of parameters and therefore is more complicated.
In this paper we analyze a two-user interference channel with incomplete information in which each
user knows the magnitudes of its direct channel and of the impinging channel gains and its noise power
spectrum density (PSD) but is unaware of his opponent’s direct and impinging channel gains but only
knows it statistics (see Fig. 1(a)). Based on their measurements, users choose between pre-assigned FDM
or FS (see Fig. ??). This interaction may be repeated but a with different channel realization each time.
With the same incomplete information, it was shown [2] that in a symmetric2 interference channel
with a one-time interaction, FS is the only symmetric strategy profile3 which is a NE point. This result
however is limited to scenarios where all users statistically experience identical channel conditions (due
to the symmetry assumption) and does not apply to interactions between weak and strong users.
A situation where both players use FS may lead to undesirable outcomes from a global network point
of view and even for each user individually. Thus, it is desirable to derive non FS Nash equilibrium
points which Pareto (which is component-wise larger) dominate the FS equilibrium point and lead to
improved spectrum utilization. A first step toward this goal was made in [17] where it was shown that
if users can coordinate in advance to use orthogonal FDM, there exists a non pure-FS NE point which
Pareto dominates the pure-FS NE point. This result however is also limited to symmetric interference
channels. This paper is aimed to fill this gap and derive NE points in the general case of arbitrary channel
distributions. For example, scenarios of weak and strong users (where one experiences a high level of
2Symmetric in the sense that the all channel gains (i.e. Hi,q for every i, q) are identically distributed.
3In symmetric strategy profile users are restricted to identical strategies.
3interferences and the other experiences low interference), different fading effects and cases where one
has a strong line of sight path and the other has no line of sight. The assumptions of arbitrary channel
distribution together with the incomplete information that each user possesses about the other users in his
vicinity are most suitable to the reality of selfish users operating independently in unlicensed frequency
bands. This paper provides a closed form expression for non pure-FS ǫ-NE point that increases each user’s
throughput and therefore improves the spectrum utilization, and demonstrates that this performance gain
can be substantial. The derived equilibrium point provides insights into the the behaviour of selfish and
rational wireless users. Furthermore, it does not require a central authority that imposes compliance of
the protocol. Thus, it provides guidelines for designing a protocol that users will choose voluntarily to
follow.
The paper is orginazed as follows. In Section II we define the Bayesian Interference Game (BIG). This
is a two user interference interaction with incomplete information where the channel’s direct and crosstalks
gains are arbitrarily distributed (but independent). In Section III we present the best response function
which is a user’s best action for his opponent’s given strategy. We then provide a simple expression for the
best response that depends only on the interference-to-signal ratio. In Section IV we show (Proposition
3) that non pure-FS NE points provide improved performance (with respect to pure-FS NE) to each user
individually and therefore a better spectrum utilization. We then derive a closed form expression for non
pure-FS ǫ NE points. Theorem 5 provides a sufficient condition for the existence of such points.
In section V we analyse the BIG in common wireless fading models (i.e. Rieghley and Rician and
Nakagami) and learn the behaviour of selfish and rational wireless users in various wireless environments.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Notation and Definitions
Consider a flat-fading interference channel with two players, where during a channel coherent time,
player i’s signal is given by (see Fig. 1(a))
Wi(n) = HiiVi(n) +HijVj(n) +Ni(n) (1)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, Vi(n), Vj(n) are user i’s and j’s transmit signals respectively, Ni(n) is a
white Gaussian noise with variance σ2N and Hiq, i, q ∈ {1, 2} are the channel fading coefficients which
are random variables. Throughout this paper, the index j is never equal to i. Both players have a total
power constraint p¯. We denote user i’s signal to noise ratio (SNR) and interference to noise ratio (INR)
by Xi = |Hii|2p¯/σ2N and Yi = |Hij|2p¯/σ2N respectively and denote SNRi = E {Xi}, INRi = E {Yi}.
We further denote the interference to signal ratio (ISR) by Zi = Yi/Xi. The realizations (sample points)
of Xi, Yi, Zi are denoted by xi, yi, zi respectively. When we want to stress that xi, yi, zi are the observed
values of the SNR, INR and ISR they will be denoted by SNRi, INRi and ISRi respectively.
Assumption 1: The channel gains |Hiq|2, i, q ∈ {1, 2} are continuous random variables with finite non
zero moments and the probability density functions (PDF) f|Hiq|2(h), i, q ∈ {1, 2} are finite for every
h > 0.
B. The Bayesian Interference Game (BIG)
In the BIG, user i’s channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter side are the realized values of
Xi and Yi. It does not observe Yj and Xj but only knows their distributions. The channel is divided into
two equal sub-bands and player 1’s and 2’s actions are given by
p1(θ1) = p¯[θ1, 1− θ1]
T
p2(θ2) = p¯[1− θ2, θ2]
T (2)
respectively (see Fig. ??), where θi ∈ Θi = {1, 1/2} and p¯ is the total power constraint. The actions θ = 1
and θ = 1/2 correspond to FDM and FS, respectively. This formalism implies that players coordinate
4TABLE I
USER i’S PAYOFF ui(θi, θj , SNRi, INRi)
player j chooses FDM player j chooses FS
(θj = 1) θj = 1/2
player i chooses FDM
(θi = 1)
1
2
log2 (1 + SNRi)
1
2
log2
(
1 + SNRi
1+INRi/2
)
player i chooses FS
(θi = 1/2)
1
2
log2
(
1 + SNRi
2
)
+ 1
2
log2
(
1 + SNRi/2
1+INRi
)
log2
(
1 + SNRi/2
1+INRi/2
)
in advance to use disjoint subbands in the case of FDM. This coordination can be carried out by using
Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) techniques (see e.g. [10]) where each player randomly chooses
a subband and performs a random power backoff in case of collision. This is done at the first interaction
when users exchange information (channel statistics).
We assume that during a single coherence period, players manage their spectrum only once, based on
their knowledge. Therefore, if the interaction is repeated it will be with different and independent channel
realizations. This represents a case where the channel vary fast or a case where simplicity requirements
enable a single spectrum shaping every coherence period. Player i’s utility function ui(θi, θj , SNRi, INRi)
is given in Table I. We are now ready to define the Bayesian interference game.
Definition 1: The Bayesian interference game (BIG) is defined by the following:
1) Set of players {1, 2}.
2) Action sets Θi = {1, 1/2}, i = 1, 2. Let θi ∈ Θi be the action chosen by player i, then according
to (2), θi = 1 corresponds to FDM and θi = 1/2 corresponds to FS.
3) A set of positive and independent random variables X1, Y1, X2, Y2 whose distributions are common
knowledge. Each player i observes the realized values of Xi, Yi but does not observe Xj, Yj .
4) A utility function ui (θi, θj , xi, yi) given in Table I.
5) A set of pure strategies S = S1 × S2 where every Si ∈ Si is a function that maps values of xi, yi
to an action in Θi, i.e. Si : Xi ×Yi −→ Θi, where Xi = Range(Xi) and Yi = Range(Yi).
Player i’s objective is to maximize his conditional expected payoff given his private information xi, yi,
i.e.:
πi(Si, Sj , xi, yi) , E {ui(Si, Sj, Xi, Yi)|Xi = xi, Yi = yi} , ∀xi, yi ∈ Xi ×Yi (3)
Definition 2: a NE point of the BIG is a strategy profile S = (Si, Sj) such that for every strategy profile
S˜ = (S˜i, S˜j) and every i ∈ {1, 2}
πi(Si, Sj , xi, yi) ≥ π(S˜i, Sj, xi, yi) ∀ xi, yi ∈ Xi ×Yi (4)
Since the action space is binary, a strategy Si(xi, yi) in the BIG is equivalent to a decision region
Di ⊆ Xi × Yi such that Si(xi, yi) = 1 (i.e. FDM) if xi, yi ∈ Di and Si(xi, yi) = 0.5 if xi, yi ∈ Dci .
Two comments are in order:
• Only pure strategies are considered in the BIG; that is, player i’s action is completely determined
by his observed signal xi, yi. We do not consider mixed strategies which map values of the observed
signal xi, yi to a probability distribution on Θi i.e., player i chooses randomly between FDM and FS
with probability ai(xi, yi) and 1 − ai(xi, yi) respectively. A well known theorem in game theory is
the Purification Theorem [13, Theorem 6.2]. It asserts that under some regularity conditions (among
others that each player’s utility function ui(θi, θj , xi, yi) should not be a function of xj and yj),
every mixed strategy has a pure strategy equivalent. Thus, all NE points can be reached using pure
strategies. The conditions of the Purification Theorem are satisfied in the BIG.
• In the case where player j chooses FDM, FS is not the best action for player i. His payoff can be
increased by performing waterfilling which will result in a higher rate. Therefore, it makes sense to
modify the FS action with the waterfilling action as considered in [1, 6, 11] for interactions with
complete information. There are, however, two important caveats. The first is that the waterfilling
5solution in the interference channel must be carried out iteratively, where at every iteration players
measure their interference and shape their spectrum accordingly. The process needs to be repeated
within the channel coherence time until convergence4. This may lead to large overhead in time
varying channels and therefore is impractical. Moreover, the iterative waterfilling procedure does not
necessarily converge [8]. The second caveat is the analysis of the resulting game in the framework of
incomplete information. The result is a game with incomplete information where in addition to not
knowing their opponent’s utility, players do not know their own utility function since it depends on
their opponent’s CSI. The analysis of such games is more complex and presents a greater challenge.
For example, the Purification Theorem is not satisfied if players use iterative water filling.
III. BEST RESPONSE AND APPROXIMATE BEST RESPONSE
An important notion in game theory is the best response function. The best response function of player
i maps each of player j’s strategies to an action for which player i’s payoff is maximized. This function is
used to derive NE points and is also important for understanding the players’ preferences and the nature
of the game.
In this section we present an expression for the best response function of the BIG. This expression,
however, is too complex for deriving a closed form expression for NE points of the BIG. Worse, it does
not provide insights into the game. For these reasons we obtain a simple approximation for the best
response function which provides greater insights into the game and will enable us to obtain a closed
form expression for near NE points of the BIG.
A. Best Response Function
We now derive player i’s best response to Sj - player j’s strategy. Note that ui(1, 1, xi, yi) > ui(1, 1/2, xi, yi)
since the log is a monotonic function, and furthermore, due to Jenssen’s inequality, ui(1/2, 1/2, xi, yi) >
ui(1, 1/2, xi, yi). Thus, the following situations are possible:
• Ai is the case in which ui(1, 1, xi, yi) ≥ ui(1/2, 1, xi, yi) which is equivalent to INRi > SNRi/2
• Bi is the case in which ui(1/2, 1, xi, yi) ≥ ui(1, 1, xi, yi) which is equivalent to INRi ≤ SNRi/2
Recall that player i is not aware of the state of his opponent (Aj or Bj) but only of his probabilities.
If player i experiences situation Bi (which is ISRi ≤ 1/2), then FS is his best response. This is because
FS is a strongly dominating action; that is, it produces a higher payoff to player i given any action of his
opponent. It remains to find player i’s best response for situation Ai; i.e. the case where ISRi > 1/2,
that is, strong interference. Let P (Sj = 1) (the probability that player j chooses FDM), then player i’s
payoff is given by
πi(FDMi, Sj, xi, yi) = P (Sj = 1)ui(1, 1, xi, yi) + (1− P (Sj = 1))ui(1, 1/2, xi, yi) (5)
πi(FSi, Sj , xi, yi) = P (Sj = 1)ui(1/2, 1, xi, yi) + (1− P (Sj = 1))ui(1/2, 1/2, xi, yi) (6)
Observe that player i’s payoff depends on his opponent’s strategy and channel distribution only via
P (Sj = 1); hence the payoff will be denoted by πi(Si, aj, xi, yi) where
aj = P (Sj = 1) (7)
It follows that, player i’s best response is invariant to strategies with equal probability for choosing FDM5
and is dependent on Sj only via aj .
Definition 3: Let Sj be player j’s strategy with aj = P (Sj = 1). Player i’s best response to Sj is
defined by:
Sˇi(xi, yi, aj) ,
{
θi = 1, if e(xi, yi, aj) > 0 and yi/xi > 1/2
θi = 1/2, otherwise
(8)
4 See [6–8, 18–21] for further reference to the convergence of the iterative waterfilling procedure.
5 From player i’s point of view, Sj can be divided to into equivalent classes Saj = {Sj : P (Sj = 1) = aj} such that Sj =
⋃
0≤aj≤1
Saj .
6where
e(x, y, a) = πi(FDMi, aj, xi, yi)− πi(FSi, aj, xi, yi) =
1
2
a log(1 + xi)−
a
2
log
(
1 + xi
2
)
−1
2
log
(
1 + xi/2
1+yi
)
− (1− a) log
(
1 + xi
1+yi
)
+ 1
2
(1− a) log
(
1 + 2xi
1+yi
) (9)
Note that finding a NE point is equivalent to calculating aˆ1 and aˆ2 which solves the equations
a1 = P
(
Sˇ1(X1, Y1, a2) = 1
)
a2 = P
(
Sˇ2(X2, Y2, a1) = 1
) (10)
and that a1 = 0, a2 = 0 (pure-FS by both users) is a NE point regardless of the channel distribution
since FS is the best response of each player if his opponent uses FS. In this case each player’s payoff is
ui(1/2, 1/2, xi, yi). The pure-FS NE point may be very poor for both users as will demonstrated below.
B. Approximate Best Response
In order to analyze the best response function it will be simplified by an approximate best response.
This approximate best response plays in important role in deriving equilibrium points and understanding
each player’s preferences. The following proposition is needed before presenting the approximate best
response.
Proposition 1: Let
r(a, q) = log2(q)
2
− log2(1 + q) +
1
2
log2(2 + q)
− a
(
1 + log2(1 + q)−
1
2
log2(2 + q)−
1
2
log2(1 + 2q)
) (11)
then, for every 0 < a ≤ 1 the following equation
r(a, q(a)) = 0 (12)
has a unique solution q(a) > 1/2 and therefore it defines an implicit function q : (0, 1] −→ (0.5,∞].
Furthermore, q(a) is continuous and monotonically decreasing.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Definition 4 (approximate best response): Let Sj be player j’s strategy with aj = P (Sj = 1). Player
i’s approximate best response to Sj is defined by:
S˜i(xi, yi, aj) =
{
θi = 1, if ISRi = yi/xi > q(aj)
θi = 1/2, otherwise
(13)
i.e. the approximate best response compares the ISR to a threshold q(aj)6.
The intuition behind the approximation is now described. First consider the case of SNRi >> 1 (recall
that xi, yi are used interchangeably with SNRi, INRi respectively). In this case
e(SNRi, INRi, a) ≈ eˆ(SNRi, INRi, a) (14)
where
eˆ(SNRi, INRi, a) ,
1
2
aj log(SNRi) +
1
2
(1− aj) log
(
1 + 2SNRi
INRi
)
− (1− aj) log
(
1 + SNRi
INRi
)
−
aj
2
log
(
SNRi
2
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 + SNRi
2INRi
) (15)
Thus, Sˇi(xi, yi, aj) can be approximated by replacing e(SNRi, INRi, a) with eˆ(SNRi, INRi, a). Fur-
thermore, note that
eˆ(SNRi, qSNRi, a) = r(aj, q) (16)
6For a = 0, we define q(0) = lima→0 q(a) = ∞. Under this definition, player i’s best response to the case where his opponent always
chooses FS is to choose FS.
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Fig. 2. Numerical evaluation of the best response function regions given in (8) for different values of aj (a in the plot). For a given a,
points above the corresponding line belong to the FDM region.
and recall that the equation r(a, q) = 0 (see (12)) defines the function q(a). Therefore, q(a) represents an
ISR level for which FDM and FS yield approximately equal payoffs. Thus, if SNRi >> 1, Sˇi(xi, yi, aj)
can be approximated by a simple strategy which only compares the ISR to a threshold and choose action
accordingly, i.e. it chooses FDM if
INRi/SNRi = ISRi > q(aj) (17)
and chooses FS otherwise.
It remains to approximate (8) for the case where SNRi >> 1 is not satisfied. If INRi >> 1 and
ISRi > 1/2 it can be shown that (8) chooses FDM for every 0 < aj ≤ 1 and if aj = 0, it chooses
FS. Thus, (17) is the best response in this case as well since ISRi is greater than q(aj) (which is finite
for every 0 < aj ≤ 1 and is infinite for aj = 07). In the case of ISRi ≤ 1/2, the best response in (8)
(which always chooses FS because it is a strictly dominant strategy for player i) and the approximate
best response (17) coincide. This is because q(aj) ≥ 1/2 for every 0 ≤ aj ≤ 1. For the case where
INRi > 1/2SNRi but INRi and SNRi are in the same magnitude as 1, the best response in (8) cannot
be simplified. However, numerical evaluation indicates that (8) is well approximated by (17) as is depicted
in Figure 2.
We now present this idea formally. To establish the relation between the approximate and the ordinary
best responses, define:
Dˇ
aj
i ={(x, y) : e(x, y, a) > 0, and y > 0.5x} (18)
D˜
aj
i ={(x, y) : y > q(a)x} = {(x, y) : eˆ(x, y, a) > 0, and y > 0.5x} (19)
where (19) is obtained by substituting y = qx in (15) and then invoking Proposition 1. The following
lemma describes precisely the sense in which S˜i(xi, yi, aj) is approximately the best response. It shows
that in the high transmit power regime, the best response converges in probability to the approximate best
response. Thus, each player is “approximately” indifferent to whether his opponent uses the approximate
best response or the true best response.
Lemma 2: Assume the channel gains |Hiq|2, i, q ∈ {1, 2} are continuous random variables, then for
every ǫ > 0, there exist some SNR0 such that for every SNRi > SNR0, i = 1, 2 (or equivalently, for
every p¯ > p¯0)
P
(
Sˇi (Xi, Yi, aj) 6= S˜i (Xi, Yi, aj)
)
< ǫ (20)
7under the convention that ∞ >∞ is fuels.
8furthermore, if |Hiq|2, i, q ∈ {1, 2} satisfy the regularity conditions in Assumption 1, ǫ decreases like
ǫ ≤ O
(
σ2N
p¯2
+
2∑
q=1
F|Hii|2
(
σ2N
p¯1−ν
)
F|Hiq|2
(
σ2N
p¯1−ν
))
(21)
for every 0 < ν < 1.
Proof: see Appendix B.
IV. NE AND ǫ-NE POINTS OF THE BIG
A trivial NE point in the BIG is the pure-FS strategy profile . We would like to derive additional NE
points which are non-FS. These points are of interest because (if they exist) they Pareto dominate pure-FS
NE points as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Let S1, S2 be a non pure-FS NE point (i.e. P (S1 = 1), P (S2 = 1) 6= 0), then it Pareto
dominates the pure-FS NE point, i.e. πi(Si, Sj , xi, yi) ≥ ui(1/2, 1/2, xi, yi) for all xi, yi and i.
Proof: See Appendix C.
In the sequel, it is shown that if users are allowed to coordinate in advance to use disjoint subbands
in the case of FDM (as implied in (2)), FDM is possible from a game theoretic point of view and also
increases the total system throughput as well as the individual throughput.
A. Derivation of non pure-FS NE points
Proposition 3 shows that non pure-FS NE points are attractive. However, deriving such points an-
alytically is not always possible. For a symmetric game where all channel magnitudes are identically
distributed, NE points were derived in [17] where it was shown that in addition to the pure-FS NE point,
there exists a non pure-FS NE given by the following strategy profile:
Si(xi, yi) =
{
θi = 1, if yi > xi
θi = 1/2, otherwise
(22)
However, in the general case of arbitrary distributions, NE points cannot be computed analytically. This
makes them impossible to implement and analyze. We therefore address to near NE points.
Definition 5: For ǫ ≥ 0, an ǫ-near NE point is a strategy profile (Sˆ1, Sˆ2) such that
πi
(
Sˆi, Sˆj, xi, yi
)
≥ sup
Si∈Si
πi
(
Si, Sˆj, xi, yi
)
− ǫ, ∀xi, yi (23)
It is straightforward to show that for sufficiently small ǫ, ǫ-near NE points also Pareto dominate the pure
FS NE point (this follows from the continuity of the expected payoff with respect to a).
The main idea behind ǫ-near NE points is that if one of the players deviates from it, he can gain no
more than ǫ additional payoff. From a practical point of view, for sufficiently small ǫ, ǫ-near NE points
are as stable as ordinary NE points.
We are now ready to introduce the main theorem which provides an analytic expression for such points:
Theorem 4: Assume the channel gains |Hiq|2, i, q ∈ {1, 2} are continuous random variables, then for
every ǫ > 0, there exists some SNR0 such that for every SNRi > SNR0, i = 1, 2 (or equivalently, for
every p¯ > p¯0) the following strategy profile is an ǫ-near NE point:
Sˆ1 = Sˇ1(x1, y1, aˆ2) (24)
Sˆ2 = Sˇ2(x2, y2, aˆ1) (25)
where Sˇi is the best response given in (8), and (aˆ1, aˆ2) is a solution to the following equation system
a1 = 1− FZ1 (q(a2)) (26)
a2 = 1− FZ2 (q(a1)) (27)
9where FZi(z) is the distribution function of the ISR. Furthermore, if the channel gains |Hiq|2, i, q ∈ {1, 2}
satisfy the regularity conditions in Assumption 1 ǫ decreases like
ǫ ≤ O
(
σ2N
p¯2
+
2∑
q=1
F|Hii|2
(
σ2N
p¯1−ν
)
F|Hiq|2
(
σ2N
p¯1−ν
))
(28)
for every 0 < ν < 1.
Proof: see Appendix D.
Theorem 4 provides a procedure to calculate ǫ-near NE points in the high averaged received SNR
regime. First, aˆ1 and aˆ2 are obtained by solving equations (26) and (27), then ǫ-near NE points are given
by (24) and (25). Each aˆi is associated with a unique threshold ÎSRi = q(aˆi) where above it FDM is
approximately the best strategy and below it, FS is the approximately the best strategy.
Although Theorem 4 is proven rigourously in Section D, we now explain it intuitively. The idea behind
the proof is to approximate player i’s best response Sˇi(xi, yi, aˆj) by the simple approximate best response
S˜i(xi, yi, aˆj) that satisfies
P
(
S˜i(Xi, Yi, aˆj) = 1
)
≈ P
(
Sˇi(Xi, Yi, aˆj) = 1
) (29)
Note that the LHS of (29) can be expressed in closed form. This way, the equations in (10) are approxi-
mated by (26)-(27). This enables us to obtain aˆ1, aˆ2 analytically with the corresponding ǫ-near NE point
given in (24-25).
B. Existence of ǫ-near NE Points
Now that a procedure to derive ǫ-near NE points has been established, we investigate the existence
properties of such points. The following theorem presents a sufficient condition for the existence of a
ǫ-near NE point.
Theorem 5: Assume that Zi, i = 1, 2 are continuous random variables such that P (Zi < 0.5) < 1 and
denote the corresponding densities by fZi(z). A sufficient condition for the existence of a solution to
equations (26), (27) is that
lim
b→∞
fZi(b)b
2 log(b) =∞ (30)
for every i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof: see Section E.
Theorem 5 asserts that if the ISR’s PDF is tail heavy (as given exactly in (30)), non pure-FS strategies
are possible and beneficial to both users. This condition is satisfied in important channel models including
Rayleigh, Rician and Nakagami fading (as demonstrated in Section V).
V. THE BIG IN COMMON CHANNEL MODELS
In this section we study the BIG in practical channel models such as Rayleigh, Nakagami and Rician.
We will study the effect of different fading intensities on the players’ preferences, the existence and
uniqueness properties of NE points and the performance gain.
10
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ç ç ç ç ç
ç ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2
0
1
2
3
4
5
ISR @dBD
G
ai
n
@d
BD
ç ISR1 = ISR2 = -6 dB
ó ISR1 = ISR2 = 0 dB
(a) symmetric scenarios
ó ó
ó ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ó
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
ISR @dBD
G
ai
n
@d
BD
ç weak
ó strong
(b) weak strong scenario
Fig. 3. The difference (dB) between the conditional expected payoffs of non pure-FS and pure-FS NE points as a function of ISR. The
channel distributions are Rayleigh. (a) Two symmetric game scenarios: weak-weak (0 dB) and strong-strong (-6 dB). Each curve represents
the gain in the corresponding scenario. (b) Weak-strong scenario, the weak ISR = −6 dB whereas the strong ISR = 0 dB.
A. Nakagami channel
The Nakagami distribution [see e.g. 10, Sec. 3.2.2] is parameterized by averaged received magnitude
and fading parameter m, i.e. X’s PDF is given by
fX (x) =
(
m
SNR
)m
xm−1
Γ(m)
exp
(
−mx
SNR
)
(31)
where SNR is the averaged level of the SNR.
We now study the existence of non pure-FS NE points using Theorem 5. Denote the averages and
the fading parameters of X and Y by SNR, m1 and INR, m2 respectively. Using the formula for
transformation of random variables [see e.g. 22], the PDF of Z = X/Y is given by
fZ(z) =
ISR
m1
mm11 m
m2
2 Γ(m1 +m2)
Γ(m1)Γ(m2)
zm2−1(
m2z + ISRm1
)m1+m2 (32)
where ISR = INR/SNR. Thus, by applying Theorem 5, a sufficient condition for the existence of a
non pure-FS NE point is that the fading coefficient of the direct channel of both users must satisfy
m1 ≤ 1 (33)
In particular, this condition is satisfied in Rayleigh fading channels.
Figure 3 shows the benefit of non pure-FS over pure-FS NE points for different values of ISR in
Rayleigh fading channel (i.e. m = 1 for all paths). Figure 3(a) depicts a symmetric weak-weak scenario
and a symmetric strong-strong scenario. In both cases the conditional expected payoff is higher for both
players and increases with the ISR. However, in the weak-weak scenario, the gain is significant. Figure
3(b) depicts a weak-strong scenario (ISR = −7 corresponds to the strong). In this case, it is clear that
the weak player gains more than the strong one, but non pure-FS is better for both of the players.
In order to obtain insights into the BIG in Nakigimi channels, we address to numerical evaluation of the
approximate best response function (13) for different values of distribution parameters. To study the effect
of m1, the fading parameter in the direct channel, Figure 4 depicts the threshold ISR of the approximate
best response of player i as a function of m1. This is evaluated for different values of ISR. It is shown
that the threshold ISR is a decreasing function of m1. This is violated only if interference is very strong
(ISRi = 10 dB) whereas the threshold ISR is hardly affected by the values of m1. From this we deduce
that a low fading effect (smaller probabilities of deep fade) in the direct channel (i.e. high values of m1)
encourages the use of FS (since the threshold ISR increases).
In Figure 5, we study the effect of m2, the fading parameter of the interfering channel. In this case we
see that the effect of m2 on the threshold ISR of the approximate best response depends on other factors
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channel. The horizontal axes represent the fading coefficient of the interference channel m2. Figure 5(a) depicts the threshold ISR for both
low and high level of aj (the opponent’s probability of choosing FDM) with fixed value of the fading parameter in the direct channel
(m1 = 1). Figure 5(b) depicts the threshold ISR for two levels of m1 with aj = 0.1.
such a m1 and aj . For low levels of aj , it can be seen in Figure 5(a) that the threshold ISR is a increasing
function of m2 while it is a decreasing function for higher values on aj . In other words, if your (assuming
that you are player i) opponent favours (does not favour) FDM, you should consider FDM (FS) more
strongly as the interference to your receiver becomes more dominant by the line of sight path than by
the reflected paths. Figure 5(b) shows the same for the parameter m1; i.e. if a player experiences high
probability of fading in the direct channel, he should consider FDM (FS) more strongly if the interference
to his receiver becomes more dominant by the line of sight than by the multipath.
In Figures 6,7 we study the existence properties of ǫ-near NE points in different channel configurations.
Figure 6(a) shows a Rayleigh fading channel with two users and illustrates the ǫ-near NE point. Figure
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Fig. 7. A scenario where the conditions of Theorem 5 are not satisfied
6(b) shows that ǫ-near NE points are not necessarily unique. In Figure 7 we show a scenario the conditions
of Theorem 5 are not satisfied.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we applied Bayesian games to analyze a two user wireless interference channel with
incomplete information. Each player knows its own direct and interfering channel magnitudes but only
knows the statistics of its opponent’s channel.
The main result of this paper is the derivation of a non pure-FS ǫ-NE point in the BIG with minimal
coordination between users. This is a much better alternative than the pure-FS NE point which may be
very inefficient. The non pure-FS point offers better spectrum utilization efficiency than the pure-FS Nash
equilibrium. This is true for each user individually and in terms of a global network. Through numerical
examples, we demonstrated that this performance gain can be substantial. We further provided a sufficient
condition for the existence of non pure-FS ǫ-NE and which is satisfied in particular in a Rayleigh fading
channel. We also demonstrated numerically that such points exist in many other scenarios.
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In addition to the derivation of the non pure-FS NE points, in Section III we presented the best response
and the approximate best response function that converges in probability to the best response as the
transmitted-power to noise ratio increases. The approximated best response funcntion simply compares
the measured interference-to-noise ratio to a threshold that depends on the opponents’s probability of
choosing FDM and on channel distribution. These results were later used in Section V to analyse selfish
and rational behaviour of wireless users as a function of the channel parameters. It was shown that:
• Strong fading (high probabilities for deep fade) in the direct channel encourages wireless selfish users
to use FDM.
• Strong fading in the interfering channel encourages selfish wireless users with strong fading in the
direct channel to use FDM, while it has the opposite effect on users with weak fading in the direct
channel.
• Strong fading in the interfering channel encourages selfish wireless users to use FDM if the opponent
chooses FDM with high probabilities, while it has the opposite effect if the opponent chooses FDM
frequently.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Observe that r(a, b) is a continuous, differentiable and strictly increasing function of b for every a. It
can be shown that r(a, 1/2) < 0 and that limb−→∞ r(a, b) > 0 for all a > 0. Thus, r(a, q(a)) = 0 defines
an implicit differentiable function q(a) that satisfies q(a) > 1/2 for every 0 < a ≤ 1.
We show that q(a) is a strictly monotonic decreasing function of a. This can be established by observing
the derivative of q(a)
q′(a) =
(
− q(a)(1+q(a))(2+q(a))(1+2 q(a))
2+4q(a)−a q(a)+aq2(a)
)
(2 + 2 log(1 + q(a))− log(2 + q(a))− log(1 + 2 q(a))) (34)
Since q(a) > 1/2 the derivative is negative. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Since Sˇi and S˜i are binaries in their range, it is sufficient to show that
|P ((Xi, Yi) ∈ Dˇ
aj
i )− P ((Xi, Yi) ∈ D˜
aj
i )| ≤ ǫ, ∀ p¯ > p¯0 (35)
Henceforth, the indices i, j are omitted, a will denote aj and Dˇa, D˜a will denote Dˇaji , D˜
aj
i .
Let p¯n, αn be sequences satisfying limn→∞ p¯n, αn = ∞ such that αn = o (p¯n),8 denote Xn =
p¯n|Hii|
2/σ2N , Y
n = p¯n|Hij|
2/σ2N , Pn(A) =P ((X
n, Y n) ∈ A). Further denote An = {Xn > αn} and
Bn = {Y
n > αn/2}.
Define
Ψin =
(
Dˇa∆D˜a
)⋂
Gi (36)
(see Figure 8 for illustration) where G1 = An
⋂
Bn, G2 = A
c
n
⋂
Bn, G3 = An
⋂
Bcn and G4 = Acn
⋂
Bcn.
This partition satisfies
Pn(Dˇ
a∆D˜a) =
4∑
q=1
Pn (Ψ
q
n) (37)
8For deterministic sequences αn, βn with limn→∞ αn/βn = M we say that αn = O(βn) if M is finite and non zero and αn = o(βn)
if M = 0.
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Fig. 8. Graphic illustration of the partition in the proof of Lemma 2.
and
Pn
(
Ψ3n
)
= 0 (38)
Pn
(
Ψ2n
)
≤ F|Hii|2
(
σ2N
αn
p¯n
)
(39)
Pn
(
Ψ4n
)
≤ F|Hii|2
(
σ2N
αn
p¯n
)
F|Hij |2
(
σ2N
αn
2p¯n
)
(40)
where (38) is true because both strategies are identical if y ≤ 0.5x. Therefore, to show the first part of
the Lemma (Equation (20)) , it is sufficient to show that Pn (Ψ1n) = o(1). This follows from the fact that
for every a > 0,
lim
n→∞
e(αn, q(a)αn, a)− eˆ(αn, qαn, a) = 0 (41)
Thus
lim sup
n
Ψ1n = φ (42)
and from the continuity from above of measures [see e.g. 23, Theorem 1.8] it follows that
lim
n→∞
Pn (Ψn) = 0 (43)
which establishes the first part of the Lemma.
For the second part of the Lemma, we will show that
Pn(Dˇ
a∆D˜a) ≤ O
(
σ2N
p¯n
+
(
F|Hii|2
(
σ2N
α2n
p¯n
))2
+
2∏
q=1
(
F|Hiq|2
(
σ2N
p¯1−νn
)))
(44)
This requires an additional analysis of Pn(Ψ1n) and Pn(Ψ2n). For the term Pn (Ψ1n), we first assume that
that Y n > q(a)Xn. In this case
Pn
(
Ψ1n
∣∣Z > q(a),An) = P ( e(Xn, Y n, a) < 0 |An, Y n > q(a)Xn) = P 1n + P 2n (45)
where
P 1n = P
(
e(Xn, Y n, a) < 0, q(a) < Z < q(a) + 1
γn
∣∣∣An, Y n > q(a)Xn) (46)
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P 2n = P
(
e(Xn, Y n, a) < 0, q(a) + 1
γn
≤ Z |An, Y
n > q(a)Xn
)
(47)
and γn = o(αn). Before evaluating P 1n and P 2n the function e(x, y, a) will be simplified by substituting
y = zx (which is possible because x, y > 0)
e(x, z x, a) =1
2
a log(x+ 1)− a
(
1
2
log
(
x
2(xz+1)
+ 1
)
+ 1
2
log
(
x
2
+ 1
))
−(1− a) log
(
x
xz+2
+ 1
)
+ 1
2
(1− a) log
(
2x
xz+2
+ 1
) (48)
which is a bounded function of z for every x. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that the function e( 1
w
, z
w
, a)
is infinitely differentiable with bounded derivatives at w = 0. Thus, since
t(z, a) , limw→0 e(
1
w
, z
w
, a) = 1
2
(
a
(
1− log
(
1
2z
+ 1
))
+(1− a) log
(
1 + 2
z
)
+ 2(a− 1) log
(
1
z
+ 1
)) (49)
is bounded, continuous and differentiable on z > 0.5 for every a it is possible to expand e(x, z x, a) with
respect to 1/x and obtain
e(x, z x, a) = r(a, z) +Q(a, z)
1
x
+O
(
1
x2
)
(50)
where r(a, z) is defined in (11), the residual absolute value can be bounded by M/x2 where M is finite
and
Q(a, z) =
−2az4 − 7az3 − 6az2 − 7az − 2a+ 8z + 4
2z(z + 1)(z + 2)(2z + 1)
(51)
is bounded for every z, a; furthermore, since r(a, z) is a continuous and increasing function of z for every
a > 0 (as shown in Proposition 1) that satisfies r(a, q(a)) = 0, it follows that
r(a, z) = R(a)(z − q(a)) +O
(
(z − q(a))2
) (52)
where the residual absolute value can be bounded by M/(z − q(a))2 where M is finite for every a > 0
and
R(a) =
(aq(a)2 − aq(a) + 4q(a) + 2)
2q(a)(q(a) + 1)(q(a) + 2)(2q(a) + 1)
(53)
is bounded and positive for every 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 because q(a) > 1/2.
In what follows it is shown that for sufficiently large n, P 2n = 0. To see this, observe that for every
z ≥ (a) + 1
γn
e(x, z x, a)≥ r(a, z)− M1
x
− M2
x2
≥ r(a, z)− M1
αn
− M2
α2n
≥ R(a)
γn
+O
(
1
γ2n
)
− M1
αn
− M2
α2n
(54)
where M1, M2 are positive and finite for every z and a. Therefore,
γne(x, zx, a) ≥ R(a) +O
(
1
γn
)
−
M1γn
αn
−
M3γn
α2n
(55)
and becomes the R(a) > 0, ∀a > 0 and because M1 and M2 are bounded, it follows that P 2n = 0 for
sufficiently large n.
It remains to show that P 1n decreases like 1/p¯. By substituting the series expansions of r(a, z) into (50)
it follows that for every z ∈ (q(a), q(a) + 1/γn), x > αn
e(x, y, a) = R(a)(z − q) + Q(a,z)
x
+O
(
1
x2
)
+O(z − q)2
≤ R(a) (z − q(a))− M1
x
− M2
x2
−M3(z − q)
2 ≤ ηn (z − q(a))−
ξn
x
(56)
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where ηn = R(a)−M3/γn and ξn = M1 +M2/αn.
Thus,
P 1n ≤
P (0<Y n−q(a)Xn<min(ξn/ηn,Xn/γn),An)
P (Y n>Xnq(a),An)
=
∞∫
αn
q(a)x+ξn/ηn∫
xq(a)
fY n (y)fXn (x)dydx
∞∫
αn
∞∫
xq(a)
fY n(y)fXn (x)dydx
=
∞∫
αn
(FY n (q(a)x+ξn/ηn)−FY n(q(a)x))fXn(x)dx
∞∫
αn
(1−FY n (q(a)x))fX(x)dx
= µn
λn
(57)
Note that lim infn λn >0, because
λn =
∞∫
αn
(
1− F 2|Hij |
(
σ2vq(a)x
p¯n
))
fXn(x)dx ≥
p¯n∫
αn
(
1− F|Hij |2
(
σ2vq(a)x
p¯n
))
fXn(x)dx
≥
p¯n∫
αn
(
1− F|Hij |2 (σ
2
vq(a))
)
fXn(x)dx =
(
1− F|Hij |2 (σ
2
vq(a))
)
×
(
F|Hij |2 (σ
2
vq(a))
−F|Hij |2
(
σ2vq(a)αn
p¯n
))
−−−→
n→∞
(
1− F|Hij |2 (σ
2
vq(a))
)
F|Hij |2 (σ
2
vq(a)) > 0,
(58)
therefore, the first term of P 1n decreases like µn
µn≤
∞∫
0
(
F|Hij |2
(
σ2v(q(a)x+ξn/ηn)
p¯n
)
− F|Hij |2
(
σ2vq(a)x
p¯n
))
σ2v
p¯n
f|Hii|2
(
σ2vx
p¯n
)
dx
= σ
2
vξn
ηnp¯n
∞∫
0
F
|Hij |
2(q(a)v+σ2vξn/(ηn p¯n))−F|Hij |2 (q(a)v)
σ2vξn/(ηn p¯n)
f|Hii|2 (v) dv
(59)
Recall that by hypothesis f|Hiq|2 (v) is bounded for every v > 0. Thus by the LaGrange mean value
theorem, for every v ≥ δ
F
|Hij |
2(q(a)v+σ2vξn/ηnp¯n))−F|Hij |2(q(a)v)
σ2vξn/(ηnp¯n)
≤ supθ∈[0,1]
(
f|Hij |2
(
q(a)v + θξnσ
2
v
ηnp¯n
))
≤ M (60)
by invoking the dominant convergence theorem [see e.g. 23, Theorem 2.24] on the integral in (59)
limδ→0limn→∞
∞∫
δ
F
|Hij |
2(q(a)v+σ2vξn/(ηn p¯n))−F|Hij |2 (q(a)v)
σ2vξn/(ηnp¯n)
f|Hii|2 (v) dv
= limδ→0
∞∫
δ
f|Hij |2 (q(a)v)f|Hii|2 (v) dv =
∞∫
0
f|Hij |2 (q(a)v)f|Hii|2 (v) dv
(61)
where (61) is true because f|Hiq|2 (v) , i, q ∈ {1, 2} are probability densities. Furthermore, it is positive
and finite for every a. From this it follows that
P 1n ≤ O
(
σ2v
p¯n
)
(62)
and therefore
Pn
(
Ψ1n
/
Z > q(a),An
)
≤ O
(
1
p¯n
)
(63)
We now assume that that Y n ≤ q(a)Xn. In this case
Pn
(
Ψ1n
∣∣Z ≤ q(a),An) = P ( e(Xn, Y n, a) > 0 |An, Y n ≤ q(a)Xn) = P 1n + P 2n (64)
where
P 1n = P
(
e(Xn, Y n, a) ≥ 0, q(a)− 1
γn
< Z < q(a)
∣∣∣An, Y n ≤ q(a)Xn) (65)
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P 2n = P
(
e(Xn, Y n, a) ≥ 0, Z ≤ q(a)− 1
γn
∣∣∣An, Y n ≤ q(a)Xn) (66)
In what follows it is shown that for sufficiently large n, P 2n = 0. To see this, observe that for every
z ≤ q(a)− 1
γn
e(x, z x, a) ≤ r(a, z) +
M1
x
+
M2
x2
≤ r(a, z) +
M1
αn
+
M2
α2n
(67)
≤ −
R(a)
γn
+O
(
1
γ2n
)
+
M1
αn
+
M2
α2n
(68)
where M1, M2 are positive and finite for every z and a. Therefore,
γne(x, zx, a) ≤ −R(a) +O
(
1
γn
)
+
M1γn
αn
+
M3γn
α2n
(69)
and become the R(a) > 0, ∀a > 0 and because M1 and M2 are bounded, it follows that P 2n = 0 for
sufficiently large n.
It remains to show that P 1n decreases like 1/p¯. By substituting the series expansions of r(a, z) into (50)
it follows that for every z ∈ (q(a)− 1/γn, q(a)), x > αn
e(x, y, a) ≤ R(a) (z − q(a)) + M1
x
+ M2
x2
+M3(z − q)
2 ≤ ηn (z − q(a)) +
ξn
x
(70)
where ηn = R(a) +M3/γn and ξn =M1 +M2/αn. Thus,
P 1n ≤
P (−min(ξn/ηn,Xn/γn)<Y n−q(a)Xn<0,An)
P (Y n≤Xnq(a),An)
=
∞∫
αn
(FY n (q(a)x)−FY n (q(a)x−ξn/ηn))fXn(x)dx
∞∫
αn
FY n (q(a)x)fX(x)dx
= µn
λn
(71)
Note that lim infn λn >0, to see this
λn =
∞∫
αn
F 2|Hij |
(
σ2vq(a)x
p¯n
)
fXn(x)dx ≥
∞∫¯
pn
F|Hij |2
(
σ2vq(a)x
p¯n
)
fXn(x)dx
≥
∞∫¯
pn
F|Hij |2 (σ
2
vq(a))fXn(x)dx = F|Hij |2 (σ
2
vq(a))×
(
1− F|Hij |2 (σ
2
vq(a))
) (72)
therefore, the first term of P 1n decreases like µn
µn≤
∞∫
0
(
F|Hij |2
(
σ2v(q(a)x)
p¯n
)
− F|Hij |2
(
σ2v(q(a)x−ξn/ηn)
p¯n
))
σ2v
p¯n
f|Hii|2
(
σ2vx
p¯n
)
dx
= σ
2
vξn
ηnp¯n
∞∫
0
F
|Hij |
2 (q(a)v)−F|Hij |2
(q(a)v−σ2vξn/(ηn p¯n))
σ2vξn/(ηn p¯n)
f|Hii|2 (v) dv ≤ O
(
σ2v
p¯n
) (73)
which leads to
Pn
(
Ψ1n
/
Z ≤ q(a),An
)
≤ O
(
1
p¯n
)
(74)
and therefore
Pn(Ψ
1
n) ≤ O (1/p¯n) (75)
It remains to evaluate Pn (Ψ2n). Note that
Pn
(
Ψ2n
)
= P (Bn,A
c
n)Pn
(
Ψ2n
∣∣Bn,Acn) (76)
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and
P (Bn,A
c
n) ≤ O
(
F|Hii|2
(
σ2vαn
p¯n
))
(77)
it follows that
Pn
(
Ψ2n
)
≤ Pn
(
Ψ2n
∣∣ Cn)O(F|Hii|2 (σ2vαnp¯n
))
(78)
where Cn = Acn
⋂
Bn. Furthermore
Pn (Ψ
2
n| Cn)=Pn (Ψ
2
n| Cn, Z > αn/2)P (Z > αn/2| Cn) + Pn (Ψ
2
n| Cn, Z ≤ αn/2)P (Z ≤ αn/2| Cn)
≤Pn (Ψ
2
n| Cn, Z > αn/2)P (Z > αn/2| Cn) + F|Hij |2
(
σ2vα
2
n
p¯n
) (79)
where the last inequality is due to
P (Z ≤ αn/2| Cn) =
P (αn/2<Y n<Xnαn/2, Xn≤αn)
P (Y n>αn/2, Xn≤αn)
≤
P(αn/2<Y n<α2n/2, Xn≤αn)
P (Y n>αn/2, Xn≤αn)
= P (αn/2 < Y
n < α2n/2) ≤ F|Hij |2
(
σ2vα
2
n
p¯n
) (80)
It remains to calculate the term
P
(
Ψ2n
∣∣ Cn, Z > αn/2) = P (e (Xn, Y n, a) < 0| Cn, Y n/Xn > αn/2) (81)
To evaluate (81), consider the function e (x, y, a) − T (x) where T (x) = a
2
log (1 + 2x/(x+ 2)). Similar
to the derivation of (50) we obtain
e
(y
z
, y, a
)
− T
(y
z
)
= r (a, z) +
az2 − 5az − 2a+ 8z + 4
2(z + 1)(z + 2)(2z + 1)
1
y
+O
(
1
y2
)
(82)
and because r (a, z) is an increasing and positive function of z for z > q(a) and for every a and because
T (y/z) ≥ 0 for every y, z ≥ 0, the RHS of (81) is equal to zero for sufficiently large n. Thus, by
combining (80) and (78), it follows that
P
(
(Xn, Y n) ∈ Ψ2n
)
≤ O
((
F|Hii|2
(
α2nσ
2
N
p¯
))2)
(83)
and by combining it with (38), (40) and (75) we obtain the desired result. 
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Player i’s conditional expected payoff is
πi(Si, Sj, xi, yi) = max {ajui(1, 1, xi, yi) + (1− aj)ui(1, 1/2, xi, yi) (84)
, ajui(1/2, 1, xi, yi) + (1− aj)ui(1/2, 1/2, xi, yi)} (85)
where aj = P (Sj = 1). Thus, it is sufficient to show that
ajui(1/2, 1, xi, yi) + (1− aj)ui(1/2, 1/2, xi, yi) > ui(1/2, 1/2, xi, yi), ∀xi, yi ∈ Xi × Yi (86)
This is equivalent to
y3i x
2
i
2
+ 2y3i xi +
y2i x
3
i
2
+ 4y2i x
2
i + 8y
2
i xi +
x4i yi
8
+2x3i yi + 9x
2
i yi + 12yixi +
x4i
4
+ 2x3i + 6x
2
i + 6xi > 0 (87)
which is always true. 
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D. Proof of Theorem 4
We begin with the following definition:
Definition 6: An approximate NE point is the strategy profile (S˜1(x1, y1, aˆ2), S˜2(x2, y2, aˆ1)) where aˆ1
and aˆ2 are a solution to equations (26) and (27).
It remains to show that if there exists an approximate NE point, then there exists a ǫ-near NE point
given by (24) and (25). Let
a˜j = P
(
Sˇj (Xi, Yi, aˆi) = 1
) (88)
a˜i = P
(
Sˇi (Xi, Yi, a˜j) = 1
) (89)
In words, a˜j is the probability that player j chooses FDM if he is not deviating from the ǫ-near NE point
and a˜i is the probability that player i chooses FDM if he “cheats” and uses his best response to player
j’s true probability for choosing FDM a˜i rather than the probability aˆj .
To show that
(
Sˇi (xi, yi, aˆj) , Sˇj (xj , yj, aˆi)
)
satisfies (23), one needs to show that for every xi, yi ∈
Xi × Yi and for sufficiently large p¯
∆πi(xi, yi) = |πi
(
Sˇi (xi, yi, a˜j) , Sˇj (xj, yj, aˆi)
)
− πi
(
Sˇi (xi, yi, aˆj) , Sˇj (xj , yj, aˆi)
)
| < ǫ (90)
Note that ∆πi(xi, yi) 6= 0 if and only if (xi, yi) ∈ Dˇaˆj∆Dˇa˜ji (since player j’s true probability for choosing
FDM is identical in both cases and is equal to a˜j), thus
∆πi(xi, yi, aˆj, a˜j) = |e(xi, yi, a˜i)|IDˇaˆj∆Dˇa˜ji
(xi, yi) (91)
where IA(x, y) denotes the indicator function, i.e. it is equal to 1 if (x, y) ∈ A and zero otherwise. Since
(xi, yi) ∈ Dˇ
aˆj∆Dˇ
a˜j
i is equivalent to e(xi, yi, aˆj) > 0 and e(xi, yi, a˜j) ≤ 0 or vice versa, and because
e(x, y, a) is a continuous function of a, for every aˆj, a˜j there exists some a∗ in the interval between aˆj
and a˜j such that e(xi, yi, a∗) = 0. By Lemma 2, we know that a˜j −−−→
p¯→∞
aˆj , thus e(xi, yi, a˜j) −−−→
p¯→∞
0,
furthermore because e(x, y, a) is bounded for every x, y and is a linear function of a it follows that
|e(xi, yi, a˜i)|IDˇaˆj∆Dˇa˜ji
(xi, yi) = O (a˜i − aˆj) (92)

E. Proof of Theorem 5
Denote wi(aj) = 1− FZi(q(aj)) for i 6= j. Thus
w′i(aj) = −fZi(q(aj))q
′(aj) (93)
Before analyzing (93) recall that lim q(a)a→0 =∞, furthermore, it can be verified that
lim
a→0
q′(a)
q2(a) log(q(a))
= M (94)
(this follows immediately from (34). Thus, if (30) is satisfied
lim
aj→0
w′(aj) =∞ (95)
Consider the curves (26) and (27) in a two-dimensional cartesian system where a1 and a2 are given by
the horizontal and the vertical coordinates respectively. Both curves are continuous and differentiable.
Furthermore, the point (0, 0) is a common point of the two curves and the points (1 − FZ1(0.5), 1),
(1, 1 − FZ2(0.5)) lie on curves (26) and (27) respectively. Since the slop of curve (26) tends to zero as
a1 → 0 and the slope of curve (27) tends to infinity as a1 → 0, the two curves must intersect at least
once. 
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